Toward unlinkable ID Management for Multi-service Environments

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Abstract

As pervasive computing environments become popular, ID devices, such as smart cards and RFID tags, introduce multi-service environments, in which a user can receive multiple services by one ID device. However, there exists a problem that service providers can trace a user’s behavior by linking the user’s access history, if only one ID is assigned to the user.

In this paper, we propose an unlinkable ID management scheme for multi-service environments. Our scheme provides unlinkability of users’ accesses against third-party service providers, by preparing different user IDs for each service, and by using cryptographic protocol to exchange the ID between a user and a service provider, while linkability is assured between the user and the involved provider.

1 Introduction

With pervasive computing environments becoming popular, ID devices, such as smart cards and RFID tags, are introducing multi-service environments, in which a user can receive multiple services by one ID device. However, there exists a problem that service providers can trace a user’s behavior by linking the user’s access history, if only one ID is assigned to the user.

The concept of unlinkability, that third parties cannot link multiple accesses by the same user[3][4], and some technology which realizes unlinkability has been proposed[5]-[7]. However, these technologies have a problem that multi-service environments are not assumed or that service providers cannot offer customized services for each user.

In this paper, we propose an unlinkable ID management scheme for multi-service environments. Our scheme is based on PID system [1][2], which is proposed as a social infrastructure system for electronic services. Our scheme provides unlinkability of users’ accesses against third-party service providers, by preparing different user IDs for each service, and by using cryptographic protocol to exchange the ID between a user and a service provider, while linkability is assured between the user and the involved provider.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains unlinkability, and describes the related work. Section 3 presents the proposed scheme. Section 4 evaluates the proposed scheme. Section 5 concludes this paper with summary.

2 Motivation

It is possible to make a device’s ID such that it does not include personal information. However, there exists a problem that third parties such as third-party service providers can trace a user’s behavior by linking the user’s access history, if anyone can read the ID of a device unrestrictedly. Therefore, it is important to clarify the concept of unlinkability, that third parties cannot read the ID of a device unrestrictedly and cannot link the user’s access history.

2.1 Definition of Unlinkability

In [3], unlinkability is defined as a property which ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link those uses together.

In [4], unlinkability of two or more items is defined as a property that, within the system, those items are no more and no less related than they are related concerning the a-priori knowledge.

In this paper, we define unlinkability as follows: let $I_A^{n_X}$ be the n-th information that a person X gets from user A’s ID device, then we say that user A’s information is unlinkable against X, if X cannot recognize whether $I_A^{n_X}$ and $I_A^{m_X}$ ($m \neq n$) are sent by the same user. It means that X cannot distinguish $I_A^{n_X}$, $I_A^{m_X}$ and user B’s information $I_B^{n_X}$.
If a person X and Y share user’s information and cannot recognize whether $I_{AX}^n$ and $I_{AY}^n$ are sent by the same user, then we say that user A’s information is unlinkable among X and Y.

### 2.2 Related Work

In RFID systems, schemes which realize unlinkability against third parties are Randomized Hash Lock scheme[5] and one time ID scheme[6]. In these schemes, ID devices send hashed or encrypted value of ID and random number. The value which an ID device sends is not fixed, and only the service provider who knows the secret information can generate the ID from the values. Therefore, these schemes realize unlinkability against third parties. However, these schemes do not assume multi-service environments.

An information systems using smart card is anonymity authentication system[7] using group signature. In these systems, unlinkability is realized not only against third parties but also against the involved service provider using the nature of group signature that restricts even involved service provider to identify users. However, the involved service provider can verify who the regular users are, and the administrator can link the user’s access history. Therefore, service providers can deal with services that need accountability. This system satisfies unlinkability against the involved service provider. Therefore, this system enables high level protection of user’s privacy. However, there exists a problem that the provider cannot offer customized service for each user.

### 2.3 Unlinkability in Multi-service Environments

As it is addressed in previous section, there exists discussion of unlinkability in single service environment. However, it was rare for the literature to discuss unlinkability in multi-service environment.

As a recent problem in multi-service environments, there is linkability among third-party service providers. A conventional ID device has only one ID, and the ID is used by multiple service providers. Therefore, service providers can link a user’s history of each service. There exists a privacy problem that third-party service providers can trace user’s behavior if user’s access history is shared among third-party service providers. In multi-service environments, it is important to realize unlinkability among third-party service providers.

### 3 Proposed Scheme

#### 3.1 System Model

In this section, we describe the model of the ID management scheme. This model is based on PID system[1][2]. In the model, there are three entities and an individual ID called PID (Personal IDentifier)[2].

Three entities are User, Issuer, and Service provider, and these are defined as follows.

- **User**: The one who receives services. Multiple users can exist.
- **Issuer**: The one who issues and manages PID. Only a single issuer is assumed to exist. The issuer must be trusted socially.
- **Service provider**: The one who deal with services to users. Multiple service providers can exist.

PID is a long bit sequence which an issuer issues to a user. A subsequence of PID is called subPID, and this subPID is assigned to each service provider. The technique of generating subPID from PID enables flexible ID issue. For example, the length of subPIDs can be changed for every service provider.

PID issued to user $i$ is $PID_i$. $sid_{ij}$ is a subsequence of $PID_i$ issued to service provider $j$. $ID_j$ is the ID that identifies the service provider $j$. $f$ is a function which gives $sid_{ij}$ from $PID_i$ and $ID_j$. For example, $f$ is given as lookup table of $ID_j$ and $sid_{ij}$’s address of $PID_i$.

User $i$’s subPID is a unique value in the service provider $j$. It means $sid_{ij} \neq sid_{i'j}$ for arbitrary $i \neq i'$ and $j$.

Each subPID, which is issued to service providers are distinct. It means $sid_{ij} \neq sid_{i'j}$ for arbitrary $i$ and $j \neq j'$.

The process for a service provider providing services to users is as follows.

**Figure 1. The process of PID issue**

**STEP1**: The issuer examines the user’s personal identity, and gives a PID to the user(See Figure1). The
PID is stored in an ID device and the device is issued to the user. The issuer stores the PID into a database.

**STEP2:** When a service provider wants to provide service to users, the service provider applies to the issuer for permission of using the PID system. The issuer provides a list of subPIDs: $\{s_{id_1}, s_{id_2}, \ldots, s_{id_n}\}$ to the service provider $j$ (See Figure 2). The service provider stores subPIDs into a database. The issuer certifies a user’s identity and subPID.

![Figure 2. The process of services taking out subPID](image)

The channel of these steps is authentic and encrypted. Thus, user and service provider can share the subPID, which is a part of PID. A user and a service provider identify each other by **ID matching**, which is a process to confirm that both of them have the same subPID and is shown in the following paragraph. After the ID matching, normal service such as authentication, data access in ID device is provided.

If a user or a service provider abuses the system, the issuer investigates their responsibility.

The information that a user and a service provider have are as follows (see Figure 3):

- **User:** PID and $f(PID_i, ID_j)$
- **Service provider:** Service ID and a list of subPIDs

### 3.2 ID Matching Protocol

In this section, we explain **ID matching protocol**, which a user and a service provider can identify and authenticate each other without leaking user’s ID to third parties.

In conventional authentication protocols, an ID exchange is done before an authentication. Therefore, they cannot satisfy unlinkability against third parties. In our protocol, mutual authentication is done without leaking ID to third parties as follows (see Figure 4).

![Figure 4. ID Matching protocol](image)

**STEP1:** The ID device sends an authentication request to the service provider.

**STEP2:** The service provider sends the provider’s $ID_j$ and a random number $R_s$ to the ID device.

**STEP3:** The ID device calculates $s_{id_{ij}} = f(PID_i, ID_j)$ from $PID_i$ and $ID_j$. Then, the ID device sends $H(U) = H(R_s || R_u || s_{id_{ij}})^{12}$ and a random number $R_u$ to the service provider.

**STEP4:** The service provider computes $H(R_s || R_u || s_{id_{ij}})$ for all $s_{id_{ij}}$ in the $SIDs_j$. If the service provider finds a match such that $H(U) = H(R_s || R_u || s_{id_{ij}})$, the provider sends $H_s = H(s_{id_{ij}} || R_u)$ to the ID device.

**STEP5:** The ID device verifies whether $H(s_{id_{ij}} || R_u)$ becomes $H_s$.

$^{1}H(X)$ means hashed value of $X$.

$^{2}X || Y$ means combined valued of $X$ and $Y$. 
4 Discussion

4.1 Unlinkability of our scheme

Our scheme satisfies unlinkability against third parties, because the value which ID device sends is hashed of user’s ID and is not fixed. But the involved service provider can link the user’s information using the searched $s_{id_j}$, so the involved service provider can offer a customized service for each user.

In our protocol, not encryption function unit but hash function unit is implemented in ID devices, so the cost of devices can be reduced. But a service provider needs to hash all users’ subPIDs (STEP4). The more the number of user increases, the more the load of the service provider increases. Therefore, it is not easy to apply this scheme in very large-scale systems.

If a user sends $E_u = E_{K_{S_j}}(R_u||R_u||s_{id_j})$ 3 instead of $H_u$ and $R_u$ in STEP3, a service provider can get $s_{id_j}$ by decrypting $E_u$ in STEP4. The cost of decrypting $E_u$ is constant even if the number of users increases. Therefore, the problem of user increasing is solved by the public key scheme. However, ID device needs public key encryption unit, therefore it is necessary to consider the cost of device. Moreover key management scheme should be also considered.

To solve these problems, we proposed K-ID matching protocol, which is using hash function but the load of the service provider can be reduced[8].

4.2 Attacks against ID Matching

This type of attack is that an attacker sends a value as a hash value $H_u$ to a service provider and receives to services by disguising someone. The more number of users $N$ increases, the more the possibility of matching a value to the value, which is hashed of someone’s subPID increases. It means the attacker’s possibility that attack success increases.

In order to maintain the safety, our protocol should use the length of a subPID increased by $\log_5 N$ [bit] than a key of conventional authentication protocols.

4.3 Attacks against Unlinkability among third-party service Providers

Our scheme has unlinkability among third-party service providers as described in section 4.1. However, if multiple service providers share a list of subPID, unlinkability among third-party service providers may be broken through the following attacks although there are restrictions for attacking.

4.3.1 Sharing subPIDs

This type of attack is that multiple service providers offer services using only one shared subPID list. In this case, there exists a problem that the providers must provide single service to a user.

4.3.2 Multiple subPID Matching

In this attack, firstly service providers perform ID matching using one shared subPID list. After that, the service providers perform ID matching using other shared subPID list. If the interval of these ID matchings is short enough, it can be said that the ID device does not move between them. And then the service provider can recognize the information which can be gotten by subPID lists of each providers are send by the user. Therefore, the service providers can break unlinkability among third-party service providers. However, the third-party service providers must be share the subPIDs, which might be not only IDs but also the keys of mutual authentication to realize the attack.

For the countermeasure of this attack, it could be thought that the ID device rejects to response if multiple ID matching is requested in short period.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed an unlinkable ID management scheme for multi-service environments. Our scheme realizes unlinkability among third-party service providers, and is suitable for multi-service environments.

\[^3E_{K_{S_j}}(X) \text{ means encrypted valued of } X \text{ by } S_j \text{'s public key.}\]
The next challenge is to discuss the method of reducing the amount of calculation required for the server in ID matching.

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